NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
TOUCHMUSIC ENTERTAINMENT LLC,
Plaintiff
ZIKLAG IP LLC,
Plaintiff-Appellant
v.
NETFLIX, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee
2025-1960
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in No. 1:24-cv-01789, Judge Mary M. Rowland.
Decided: November 19, 2026
ANDRES C. PEREIRA, Watts LLP, Austin, TX, for plaintiff-appellant.
RACHAEL D. LAMKIN, Baker Botts LLP, San Francisco, CA, for defendant-appellee. Also represented by KIRA GILL, Palo Alto, CA.
2Before LOURIE, STOLL, and STARK, Circuit Judges.
Ziklag IP LLC appeals a final order from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois that denied Ziklag’s request to amend its complaint to re-substitute Touchmusic Entertainment LLC as the plaintiff. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
On March 3, 2024, Touchmusic accused Netflix, Inc. of infringing U.S. Patent No. 6,182,128, which had expired nearly six years earlier on March 5, 2018. However, when Touchmusic filed the complaint, its corporate rights were suspended under California law, thereby prohibiting it from initiating litigation.
This did not deter Touchmusic. Rather than dismissing the case, on April 18, 2024, Touchmusic assigned certain rights in the ’128 patent to the newly incorporated Ziklag. Touchmusic and Ziklag thereafter filed an amended complaint that substituted Ziklag for Touchmusic as the plaintiff.
Netflix moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing in part that Touchmusic did not assign Ziklag the right to sue for past damages. On March 25, 2025, the district court granted the motion to dismiss, agreeing that Ziklag did not receive the right to sue for past damages—which was fatal because the ’128 patent was long expired. Ziklag IP LLC v. Netflix, Inc. (“Dismissal Op.”), No. 24-cv-01789, 2025 WL 904311, at *4–5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 25, 2025). However, the district court declined to dismiss the case with prejudice. Instead, the district court set a hearing to “discuss the propriety of any attempt to file an amended complaint and further briefing on Illinois law and [Touchmusic’s] ability to initiate litigation.” J.A. 60.
3At the hearing, the district court stated that its purpose was to hear what Ziklag had “to say in light of the order about filing an amended complaint.” J.A. 22 ll. 14– 15. During the hearing, Ziklag argued that any issues could be cured by re-substituting Touchmusic as the named plaintiff because it retained the right to sue for past damages and its corporate status issue had been resolved. At the same time, Ziklag represented that it need not amend its complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) or Rule 17 because under Illinois law, Ziklag could be the proper plaintiff under certain circumstances.1
Approximately two weeks after the hearing, the district court denied Ziklag’s request for leave to amend its complaint to re-substitute Touchmusic. Ziklag IP LLC v. Netflix, Inc. (“Amendment Op.”), No. 24-cv-01789, 2025 WL 1725136 (N.D. Ill. June 20, 2025). The district court explained that Ziklag and Touchmusic did not make an “honest mistake” that required the requested substitution under Rule 17:
It is clear that the reason Touchmusic assigned the patent to Ziklag was to avoid the lack of capacity and relation back issues under California law caused by Touchmusic’s suspended status. Touchmusic was suspended in California when it filed the original complaint in this action on March 3, 2024. California did not lift the suspension and restore
4Touchmusic’s good standing until April 19, 2024. Ziklag was formed as a Tennessee limited liability company on April 18, 2024. On that same day, Touchmusic assigned the underlying patent to Ziklag. On May 17, 2024, Ziklag filed an amended complaint replacing Touchmusic as the plaintiff but otherwise making no changes to the original complaint. The substitution of Ziklag as the plaintiff in this action was therefore not due to an honest mistake but was done for tactical advantage to avoid the issue of Touchmusic’s suspended corporate status and the impact it could have on pursuing this lawsuit.
Id. at *2 (citations omitted). Accordingly, the district court dismissed the case with prejudice.
Ziklag appeals the district court’s determination. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).
DISCUSSION
There is one issue before us: whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Ziklag leave to amend its complaint to re-substitute Touchmusic as the plaintiff.2 We hold that it did not.
“In review of an order denying a motion to amend, a subject which is not unique to patent law, we look to the law of the regional circuit,” here, the Seventh Circuit. Kalman v. Berlyn Corp., 914 F.2d 1473, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1990). The Seventh Circuit “review[s] the district court’s denial of [a] motion to amend the complaint for abuse of discretion.” Hall v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 469 F.3d 590, 594 (7th Cir. 2006)5 (citations omitted); see also Datascope Corp. v. SMEC, Inc., 962 F.2d 1043, 1045 (Fed. Cir. 1992). “Under this standard of review we will not reverse if we merely conclude that we would have reached a different decision if asked to consider the issue in the first instance; rather, ‘the district court’s decision must strike us as fundamentally wrong.’” Hall, 469 F.3d at 594 (quoting Johnson v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 280 F.3d 1125, 1131 (7th Cir. 2002)).
Here, the district court thoroughly explained that Touchmusic and Ziklag did not make an “honest mistake” leading to Ziklag’s request to file an amended complaint. Amendment Op., 2025 WL 1725136, at *2. Because the district court found that the proposed substitution was “not due to an honest mistake,” i.e., but was done in bad faith, the district court denied Ziklag leave to amend its complaint. Id.
Ziklag argues that the court abused its discretion in two ways. First, it argues that “the court did not allow Touchmusic[3] to brief the issue on which the case was decided.” Appellant’s Br. 9–10. Second, it argues that the district court erred by “decid[ing] the case under Fed. R. Civ. P. 17, rather than Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a).” Appellant’s Br. 10. Neither argument is persuasive.
We first reject Ziklag’s argument that it did not have an opportunity to “brief the issue on which the case was decided.” Appellant’s Br. 9. As an initial matter, Ziklag had the opportunity to brief amending the complaint in response to Netflix’s argument that no leave to amend should be granted at the motion to dismiss stage, as the district court discussed in its March 25, 2025 order. Dismissal Op., 2025 WL 904311, at *5–6 (addressing Netflix’s argument “that the amended complaint should be dismissed without6 leave to amend”). Moreover, the district court’s order discussed applying Rule 17 to Ziklag’s request to amend its complaint, thereby putting Ziklag on notice that Rule 17 was at issue. The district court also set a hearing “to discuss the propriety of any attempt to file an amended complaint and further briefing on Illinois law and [Touchmusic’s] ability to initiate litigation.” J.A. 60 (emphasis added). Therefore, Ziklag had ample opportunity to address amending the complaint, and if Ziklag believed additional briefing was necessary, it could have requested leave to file such briefing. The record before us indicates that it did not. Accordingly, we are not persuaded by Ziklag’s first argument.
Next, we consider Ziklag’s argument that the district court erred by applying Rule 17 “rather than considering the usual factors under Rule 15 when deciding whether to allow a party to amend a complaint.” Appellant’s Br. 10. We also reject this argument, and Lans v. Digital Equipment Corp., 252 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2001) is instructive. In that case, the district court denied appellant’s “motion to amend his complaint to substitute . . . (a company whose managing director and sole shareholder [was] [appellant]) for himself as plaintiff under Rules 15 and 17 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Lans, 252 F.3d at 1324. The appellant argued that the district court abused its discretion. Id. at 1328. We disagreed, holding that appellant’s “personal choices occasioned . . . the need to amend. Indeed the trial court found that [appellant’s] original allegations were not honest and understandable mistakes. Under these circumstances, the district court remained well within its broad discretion in denying [appellant’s] motion for leave to amend his complaint” under both Rules 17 and 15. Id. at 1328–29 (emphases added).
Here, Ziklag’s request to re-substitute Touchmusic similarly resulted from Ziklag’s and Touchmusic’s “personal choices.” Rule 17(a)(3) “is intended to prevent forfeiture when determination of the proper party to sue is7 difficult or when an understandable mistake has been made.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 17 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment; see also 6A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1555 (3d ed. 2008) (providing that “when the determination of the right party to bring the action was not difficult and when no excusable mistake had been made, then Rule 17(a)(3) is not applicable and the action should be dismissed”).4 We see no abuse of discretion in the district court’s finding that Ziklag has not made an “understandable mistake.” As the district court found,5 “[t]he substitution of Ziklag as the plaintiff in this action was . . . not due to an honest mistake but was done for tactical advantage to avoid the issue of Touchmusic’s suspended corporate status and the impact it could have on pursuing this lawsuit.” Amendment Op., 2025 WL 1725136, at *2. The district court did not abuse its discretion in applying Rule 17.
Ziklag’s primary complaint is that the district court should have expressly applied the “typical Rule 15 requirements” for amending a complaint: “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed,8 undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.” Appellant’s Br. 10 (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). As an initial matter, Ziklag never argued to the district court that it must analyze its request within the framework of Rule 15—to the contrary, Ziklag suggested to the district court that it did not “need a [Rule] 15(a) or 17 substitution” under certain circumstances. J.A. 34 l. 25– J.A. 35 l. 1. But even if we consider Rule 15, the district court already determined that Ziklag’s request to amend is not the result of “an honest mistake,” but rather an attempt to gain a “tactical advantage to avoid the issue of Touchmusic’s suspended corporate status.” Amendment Op., 2025 WL 1725136, at *2. In other words, Ziklag’s request to amend was made in bad faith. See Chi. Joe’s Tea Room, LLC v. Vill. of Broadview, 94 F.4th 588, 607–08 (7th Cir. 2024) (holding that a district court “did not abuse [its] discretion in enforcing the Federal Rules of . . . Civil Procedure to impose consequences” where the appellant “made a tactical choice”); Vitrano v. United States, 643 F.3d 229, 234 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that if a Rule 15(a)(2) motion “doesn’t pass the sniff test, i.e., reeks of bad faith or dilatory motive, the district court is permitted to deny it and hold the plaintiff to his original complaint”). Accordingly, even considering Rule 15(a), the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ziklag leave to amend its complaint.
CONCLUSION
We have considered Ziklag’s remaining arguments and find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
AFFIRMED
Footnotes
- ↩ 1 Relevant to this case, Rule 15(a)(2) provides that “a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave. The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Rule 17(a)(3) provides in relevant part that “[t]he court may not dismiss an action for failure to prosecute in the name of the real party in interest until, after an objection, a reasonable time has been allowed for the real party in interest to ratify, join, or be substituted into the action.”
- ↩ 2 Ziklag does not challenge the district court’s determination that Touchmusic retained the right to sue for past damages. Dismissal Op., 2025 WL 904311, at *4–5 (dismissing Ziklag’s amended complaint because “Ziklag does not have the right to sue for past infringement”).
- ↩ 3 In its briefing, Ziklag at times interchangeably refers to itself and Touchmusic.
- ↩ 4 Neither party cites binding Seventh Circuit precedent regarding the application of Rule 17(a)(3). However, several district courts within the Seventh Circuit have determined that Rule 17(a)(3) does not apply when there has not been an “understandable” or “honest” mistake. See, e.g., Wilson Pools Plus, LLC v. King, No. 3:26-cv-00169-GCS, 2026 WL 1361579, at *2 (S.D. Ill. May 15, 2026); Ricalday v. Bockelmann, No. 08 C 50021, 2009 WL 10859406, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 22, 2009); Metalworking Lubricants Co. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 460 F. Supp. 2d 897, 902 (S.D. Ind. 2006).
- ↩ 5 Ziklag does not challenge the district court’s factual findings.