United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
TRAXCELL TECHNOLOGIES, LLC,
Plaintiff-Appellant
v.
CELLCO PARTNERSHIP, DBA VERIZON
WIRELESS,
Defendant-Appellee
2025-1496, 2025-1683
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas in No. 6:24-mc-00613-ADA, Judge Alan D Albright.
Decided: November 16, 2026
WILLIAM PETERSON RAMEY, III, Ramey LLP, Houston, TX, argued for plaintiff-appellant.
JACOB KEVIN BARON, Holland & Knight LLP, Boston, MA, argued for defendant-appellee. Also represented by ALLISON LUCIER; WILLIAM STERLING, San Francisco, CA.
Before DYK, CHEN, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.
2Traxcell Technologies, LLC (“Traxcell”) brought an independent action in the District Court for the Western District of Texas seeking to void a judgment of the District Court for the Eastern District of Texas. That judgment awarded attorneys’ fees in an infringement action pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 285. The Western District of Texas entered judgment denying Traxcell’s requested relief on the merits. We conclude that we have appellate jurisdiction. But because we determine the District Court for the Western District of Texas did not have jurisdiction, we vacate the judgment and remand with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
BACKGROUND
Traxcell, the owner of U.S. Patent Nos. 8,977,284, 9,510,320, 9,642,024, and 9,549,388, filed suit on October 31, 2017, in the Eastern District of Texas, alleging that Verizon Wireless Personal Communications, LP (“Verizon”)1 infringed its patents. At claim construction, the district court held some asserted claims indefinite, and on April 15, 2020, the district court granted summary judgment of noninfringement to Verizon on the remaining claims. Verizon then moved for attorneys’ fees.
While Verizon’s motion for fees was pending, Traxcell appealed the district court’s judgment. On October 12, 2021, we affirmed the judgment of indefiniteness and noninfringement. See Traxcell Techs., LLC v. Sprint Commc’ns Co. (Traxcell I), 15 F.4th 1121, 1128–36 (Fed. Cir. 2021). On December 22, 2022, the district court awarded attorneys’ fees to Verizon pursuant to 35 U.S.C.3 § 285 and ordered Traxcell to pay within thirty days. Traxcell again appealed, contending that the district court improperly found that Traxcell knew or should have known its infringement theories were baseless, but not arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction to award fees. We again affirmed in a Rule 36 judgment. Traxcell Techs., LLC v. AT&T Inc. (Traxcell II), No. 23-1246, 2023 WL 4503520 (Fed. Cir. July 13, 2023). Traxcell sought, and the Supreme Court denied, certiorari.
Not deterred, Traxcell filed an Emergency Motion for Relief from Judgment in the Eastern District of Texas, arguing for the first time that our mandate on the merits in Traxcell I prohibited the district court from subsequently granting Verizon’s motion for attorneys’ fees. In Traxcell’s view, our mandate affirming the final judgment dismissing Traxcell’s claims deprived the court of jurisdiction to award attorneys’ fees. That motion is still pending before the Eastern District. Apparently seeking another avenue to block the fee award, Traxcell filed an independent action (an equitable cause of action preserved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(d)(1)) against Verizon in the Western District of Texas, making substantially the same arguments as in its emergency motion in the Eastern District.
On December 5, 2024, Traxcell moved for a preliminary injunction in the Western District to bar Verizon from enforcing the attorneys’-fees award. The district court denied the motion because Traxcell did not show a substantial likelihood that it would prevail on the merits or suffer irreparable harm. The district court concluded that “Traxcell has no reasonable likelihood of prevailing in this case because the Verizon [fee award] is not void.” J.A. 17.2 The parties accordingly stipulated to final judgment against4 Traxcell’s independent-action claim, subject to Traxcell’s right to appeal. Traxcell timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I
Verizon suggests that we lack jurisdiction over this appeal because Traxcell’s right to relief depends only on non-patent issues. We have jurisdiction over the appeal of a final decision of a district court “in any civil action arising under . . . any Act of Congress relating to patents or plant variety protection.” 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1). Our jurisdiction extends to “those cases in which a well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal patent law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal patent law, in that patent law is a necessary element of one of the well-pleaded claims.” Xitronix Corp. v. KLA-Tencor Corp., 882 F.3d 1075, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (emphasis in original) (quoting Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 809 (1988)).
Verizon argues that we lack appellate jurisdiction because this case does not require the resolution of a substantial question of federal patent law, just the application of the mandate rule. We disagree.
Traxcell’s action is, on its face, an action to set aside a judgment for attorneys’ fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285, a provision of the Patent Act. Traxcell’s action in the Western District of Texas is similar to an action for declaratory judgment that it is not liable for attorneys’ fees. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Fam. Ventures, LLC, 571 U.S. 191, 198 (2014); see also Imagineering, Inc. v. Van Klassens, Inc., 53 F.3d 1260, 1263 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“Since section 285 appears in title 35 and was enacted as a part of United States patent law, the question whether a case is exceptional within the meaning of section 285 arises under5 the Patent Act.”). In declaratory-judgment cases, the Supreme Court has instructed this court to look at whether “the hypothetical threatened action [of the declaratory defendant] is properly characterized as an action ‘arising under [any] Act of Congress relating to patents’” to evaluate its jurisdiction. Medtronic, 571 U.S. at 198 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a)). When the hypothetical threatened action meets this criterion, this court has jurisdiction over the appeal. See id. We would have jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment action challenging a fee award under § 285. This case is akin to a declaratory judgment action of no liability.
II
Relief pursuant to Rule 60(d) is a question of regional circuit law, here, the Fifth Circuit. See Engel Indus., Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 166 F.3d 1379, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
Although not raised by the parties, we are obligated to consider whether the Western District had jurisdiction. “Federal courts ‘are all of limited jurisdiction, and their proceedings are erroneous, if the jurisdiction be not shown upon them.’” Hain Celestial Grp., Inc. v. Palmquist, 607 U.S. 421, 428 (2026) (quoting Kempe’s Lessee v. Kennedy, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 173, 185 (1809)). “[A] federal court of appeals must ‘satisfy itself not only of its own jurisdiction, but also of that of the lower courts in a cause under review.’” Id. (quoting Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237, 244 (1934)).
A
Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides the mechanisms for a court to grant relief from a judgment or order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(a)–(c). One mechanism recognized in Rule 60 is the independent action, an equitable cause of action predating the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 45 (1998). Subdivision 60(d)(1) clarifies that6 Rule 60 “does not limit a court’s power to . . . entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment.” The notes accompanying the 1946 amendments to the Rule state:
Two types of procedure to obtain relief from judgments are specified in the rules as it is proposed to amend them. One procedure is by motion in the court and in the action in which the judgment was rendered. The other procedure is by a new or independent action to obtain relief from a judgment, which action may or may not be begun in the court which rendered the judgment.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 advisory committee’s note to 1946 amendment. “The usual procedure” for Rule 60 relief “is by motion in the court and in the action in which the judgment was rendered.” 11 Wright & Miller’s Federal Practice & Procedure § 2851 (3d ed. 2012).
Independent actions are limited to highly unusual circumstances. “Independent actions must, if Rule 60([b–d]) is to be interpreted as a coherent whole, be reserved for those cases of ‘injustices which, in certain instances, are deemed sufficiently gross to demand a departure’ from rigid adherence to the doctrine of res judicata.” Beggerly, 524 U.S. at 46 (quoting Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 244 (1944)). As such, “an independent action should be available only to prevent a grave miscarriage of justice.” Id. at 47. There must be “a sufficient probable showing of circumstances which, if finally sustained after proof and hearing, would justify some character of equitable relief.” Bros Inc. v. W. E. Grace Mfg. Co., 320 F.2d 594, 607 (5th Cir. 1963).
B
We conclude first that the Western District of Texas lacked jurisdiction. First, Traxcell’s motion does not come close to presenting a case that qualifies as a permissible7 independent action under Beggerly. Traxcell’s briefing does not cite Beggerly, makes no mention of the grave-miscarriage standard, and does nothing to support the notion that the award works a grave miscarriage of justice. Traxcell argues that the district court’s § 285 analysis, examining the totality of the circumstances, violates the mandate rule because it reconsiders arguments already decided by this court in Traxcell I. But it is proper for a district court to consider attorneys’ fees separately after a final judgment on the merits as invited by Rule 58(e). See Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 202–03 (1988). A “District Court . . . ha[s] discretion to refrain from addressing any issues solely related to § 285 until after completion of any appeals from a final judgment on other issues.” Mosaic Brands, Inc. v. Ridge Wallet LLC, 55 F.4th 1354, 1360 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2022). This court routinely reviews awards of fees under § 285 after it previously ruled on the merits. See, e.g., In re PersonalWeb Techs. LLC, 85 F.4th 1148, 1152–53 (Fed. Cir. 2023); Dragon Intell. Prop., LLC v. Dish Network LLC, 956 F.3d 1358, 1360–61 (Fed. Cir. 2020); Nova Chems. Corp. (Can.) v. Dow Chem. Co., 856 F.3d 1012, 1015–16 (Fed. Cir. 2017). The frivolous theory that the Eastern District of Texas lacked jurisdiction to award attorneys’ fees does not come close to satisfying the gravemiscarriage-of-justice standard.
Under Beggerly, a district court lacks jurisdiction over an independent action if the allegations of the complaint fail to meet the high standard for an independent action. In Indian Head Nat’l Bank of Nashua v. Brunelle, the First Circuit considered a plaintiff’s independent action in the District of New Hampshire in an enforcement action to void a judgment of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 689 F.2d 245, 247–48 (1st Cir. 1982). The plaintiff’s ground for relief was negligence of counsel at the rendering court. Id. at 247, 250. The First Circuit concluded that “[b]ecause the alleged injustice . . . is not of the type 8generally considered sufficient to warrant an exercise of independent equitable jurisdiction, we decline to uphold the district court’s action by viewing it as a proper exercise of that jurisdiction.” Id. at 250.
So too in United States v. Foy, the Third Circuit concluded that satisfaction of the Beggerly standard was jurisdictional. 803 F.3d 128, 135 (3d Cir. 2015). A plaintiff brought an independent action in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania challenging a civil commitment order entered by the Western District of Missouri. Id. at 131–32. The circuit concluded that the Eastern District of Pennsylvania lacked jurisdiction over the independent action, stating, “Though we recognize that there may be circumstances in which a district court has jurisdiction over a Rule 60 motion or an independent action seeking relief from a judgment entered by another court, . . . [plaintiff] does not point to such an independent ground for jurisdiction here.” Id. at 135.
Moreover, Traxcell did not raise a jurisdictional argument in its earlier fees proceeding. See generally Appellant’s Opening Br., Traxcell II, No. 23-1246, Dkt. No. 66 (Fed. Cir. June 9, 2023). “A party that has had an opportunity to litigate the question of subject-matter jurisdiction may not . . . reopen that question in a collateral attack upon an adverse judgment.” Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 n.9 (1982). Traxcell’s attempt to rely on an argument unraised in the Eastern District of Texas or the appeal therefrom cannot be “a sufficient probable showing” that warrants “some character of equitable relief.” See Bros Inc., 320 F.2d at 607.
C
We also conclude that the Western District of Texas lacked jurisdiction in this case because one district court may not entertain an independent action to set aside another district court’s judgment that has been affirmed on appeal, whether or not the Beggerly standard is satisfied.
9Where an independent action seeking relief from judgment is brought in the rendering court, the action is “ancillary” to the judgment, and the rendering court has ancillary jurisdiction “to secure or preserve the fruits and advantages of a judgment or decree rendered therein.” Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 239 (1934). Ancillary jurisdiction thus supports independent actions filed in the rendering court. Mitchell, 293 U.S. at 243. But the Supreme Court declined to decide whether an independent action may be brought in a different court. Ibid.
Even if the jurisdiction of the second federal court exists, it cannot extend to this case. Traxcell’s independent action seeks to countermand a judgment already affirmed by this court. See Traxcell II, No. 23-1246, 2023 WL 4503520 (Fed. Cir. July 13, 2023). A district court has no jurisdiction over an independent action or Rule 60 cause of action seeking to overturn an order of a court of appeals. See Mason v. Judges of the U.S. Ct. of Appeals for the D.C. Cir., 952 F.2d 423, 426 (D.C. Cir. 1991); see also Lancaster v. Presley, 35 F.3d 229, 232 (5th Cir. 1994).
In Mason, a plaintiff asserting personnel and torts claims lost a bench trial in district court, and judgment for the defendant was summarily affirmed by the D.C. Circuit. 952 F.2d at 424. Years later, the plaintiff filed an independent action in district court seeking to void the earlier-affirmed judgment on the theory that the summary-affirmance procedures of the Court of Appeals were unlawful. Id. The D.C. Circuit affirmed dismissal of the independent action, explaining, “We know of no basis upon which a district court may entertain an independent action to modify a judgment of a court of appeals . . . .” Id. at 426.
Similarly, in Lancaster, an incarcerated plaintiff sought a writ of habeas corpus, which was denied in district court. Lancaster, 35 F.3d at 230. The Fifth Circuit dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal for failure to prosecute. Id. at 230–31. More than two years later, the plaintiff filed a10 Rule 60(b) motion in the same district court that rendered the judgment seeking to vacate or set aside its habeas denial. Id. at 231. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion, explaining that the plaintiff “asks the district court . . . to overturn this Court’s dismissal of his appeal. Quite obviously, the district court lacks jurisdiction to overturn an order of [the Court of Appeals]. Rule 60(b)(6) . . . certainly does not confer super-appellate jurisdiction on the district court.” Id. at 232.
The Western District of Texas thus lacked jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
We conclude that we have appellate jurisdiction over Traxcell’s case because it arises under federal patent law. However, we conclude the district court did not have jurisdiction over Traxcell’s independent action. Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s judgment and remand with instructions to dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction.
VACATED AND REMANDED
COSTS
Costs to Verizon.